Saturday, 26 September 2009

The Promise of Exodus

Critics charge a U.S. based group is ‘manufacturing’ Ethiopian Jews to bolster Israel’s orthodox population.

BY Joshua Hammer

ASHAGRAY ZELEKE is on the front limes of a war over Israel’s future. The local representative of the North American Conference on Ethiopian Jewry (NACOEJ),
Zeleke administers a compound in Addis Ababa where thousands of Falash Mura Ethiopian Christians who claim Jewish ancestry learn the rites of the faith while awaiting emigration to Israel. Leading a visitor through the iron gates, Zeleke proudly shows off Hebrew lessons in progress and a makeshift synagogue where 300 men wearing yarmulkes and prayer shawls bow fervently before an ark inscribed in Amharic. “Some have been waiting a decade to leave for Israel,” he says. “ They really feel Jewish inside.” There’s just one problem: according to many Israeli officials, barely 40 percent of the Ethiopians languishing in this compound have Jewish roots.

NACOEJ’s ambitions have ignited an angry debate in Israel that cuts to the heart of the Jewish state’s identity. Critics charge that the U.S.-based group, in an effort to spread Orthodox Judaism and beef up Israel’s Jewish population, is “manufacturing Jews ”—luring Ethiopian Christians out of their villages, inflating the numbers of those it claims have Jewish ancestry and trading food and the promise of exodus 31for religious conversion. NACOEJ, which insists that all the Ethiopians in its compounds are Jews, has found am alliance with some powerful sectors of Israeli society The Palestinian intifada has drastically reduced the number of diaspora Jews interested in emigrating to Israel: the number dropped from 61,000 in 2000 to 21,000 last year. Amid fears that Muslims may soon outnumber Jews in Israel and the occupied territories, some Likud Party leaders and religious right wingers see resettling the Falash Mura as one way of guaranteeing the strength of the Jewish population.

Early this month, Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom announced that he would speed up the resettlement of 24,000 Falash Mura living in NACOEJ compounds in Addis Ababa and Gondar in northern Ethiopia. That followed a statement last year by Israel’s chief Sephardic rabbi that the Falash Mura were “ complete Jews without any doubt ” and a decision by the Interior Ministry then run by a leader of the Shas religious party to admit the Falash Mura in accordance with Israel’s law of entry. That law allows for family reunifications as long as the prospective immigrant can show maternal linkage to Judaism.

But Shalom’s promise provoked a backlash from lawmakers who question the authenticity of the Falash Mura’s claims, and who argue that Israel can’t afford the speedy resettlement of thousands of destitute Ethiopians. Tzipii Livne, the minister of Immigrant Absorption, estimates that 10,000 of the 24,000 in the compounds will qualify for immigration and believes strict limits must be drawn. “ You could have a chain of family members demanding to come in, ” she says. “ Where does it end? ”

NACOEJ feeds, educates and provides free health care to the Falash Mura, and indoctrinates them in Orthodox Jewish rituals In 1998 Israel reluctantly agreed to accept al 3,000 Falash Mura then in the two compounds, then ordered the Americans to shut down the facilities. Within days, however thousands more Falash Mura poured in to replace them. Relations between NACOEJ and Israel have been strained ever since. Israeli officials, and some leaders of the Ethiopian Jewish community, charge that NACOEJ aggressively recruits Falash Mura in rural Ethiopia. Unemployment is rife among those who move into the compounds. “ In villages they have respect. They’re not rich, but they farm, they are self sufficient, ” says Dani Abebe, am Ethiopian journalist for Yediot Ahronot. “ They come to Addis and they have nothing. ”

The committee’s former president, Joseph Feit, insists that NACOEJ makes no attempt to recruit villagers in rural Ethiopia. He says that the Falash Mura’s return to Judaism is heartfelt, and not motivated by material incentives, and accuses the Minister of the Interior of foot-dragging to avoid the burden of bringing in poor Africans. Livne says the government isn’t opposed to letting in Falash Mura, but she wants a strict vetting process to be put in place. After that, she says, NACOEJ must close down the compounds. That’s an order the committee has resisted before, and will likely resist again.

The New Blasphemy.

By Tara Pepper

Britain debates the limits of religious free speech.

Newsweek International

Omar Marzouk, a Muslim comedian from Denmark, had but one request at last month's Edinburgh Fringe Festival. "Tell me if you don't find my jokes funny." he told his audience. "I don't want to die— I'm not that kind of Muslim."

Poking fun at the world's religions was de rigueur at Edinburgh's annual stage jamboree. Reason: fears that a controversial new " anti-blasphemy " law could curtail freedom of speech. The proposed legislation, to be debated by Britain's House of Lords next month, allows prosecution in cases where behavior or written material—such as a book, play or broadcast—could potentially incite religious hatred. Home Office officials say the law would not bar legitimate criticism of religion—nor comedians' lampooning of faiths—but argue that there must be some defense against speech motivated by religious hatred. With religion intruding into politics and the arts across Europe, though, many worry the legislation is a step too far.

Europeans have long had laws against blasphemy. Most are holdovers from the late 17th century and, until recently, were all but dead. But lately religious groups have seized upon them. In Italy, journalist Oriana Fallaci, whose criticism of the country's Muslims has won support from the conservative, anti-immigration right, is awaiting trial on charges of vilifying Islam. French bishops have taken legal action against a Marithe + Francois Girbaud ad they say mocks the Last Supper. In Denmark, Muslims filed complaints against two state TV stations after they broadcast excerpts of " Submission," by the murdered Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh, portraying violence against women as endemic in Islam. Some think Britain's new law will be used similarly. "It's about saving Muslims from attack," says religious historian David Nash—a perfectly reasonable goal, he adds, "except that the law will be used indiscriminately by religious groups who want to see offense. "

Existing British blasphemy laws cover Christianity. Sikhs and Jews are shielded because they are regarded as distinct races falling under laws prohibiting incitement to racial hatred. Muslim groups have lobbied for similar protection since 1988, with the publication of Salman Rushdie's "The Satanic Verses," and they stepped up their efforts after 9/11 out of fear of an anti-Islam backlash. For critics, however, the question is whether any religion should be so protected. " Any system of ideas that requires you to ring-fence it is a mistake," Rushdie said recently. Many artists in Edinburgh questioned whether his work would even be published under the proposed law.

Supporters say such concerns are overwrought. "The lords will look for tight drafting, with guarantees that it won't be used in respect of comedians or literature of a serious kind," says Rabinder Singh, chairman of the British bar's race and religion committee. As for Marzouk, he's not fazed. Denmark already has similar laws, he notes. " Every human being holds something holy," he told his Edinburgh audience in a neat segue to the serious.

"We can all have some respect for that."

Se habla electoral votes

Bush's immigration plan looks like a smart ploy for Hispanic support. But the political landscape is trickier than it seems.

By Arian Campo-Flores
Newsweek

Jan. 19 issue -

For Armando Gutierrez, a Democratic consultant on Latino issues, President George W. Bush's immigration proposal last week signaled the opening salvo in the battle for Hispanic votes. Uh-oh, he thought. The Bushies are serious. Here they come. As policy, Gutierrez considers Bush's plan—which would grant temporary legal status to millions of undocumented workers, but no certain path to citizenship—nothing more than a means to exploit cheap labor. As politics, however, Gutierrez—who is working on Howard Dean's campaign—concedes that it's "a very savvy, very astute move."

Consider it Bush's latest overture in his persistent courtship of Latinos, with his broken español and roots in immigrant-rich Texas. In 2000 he won 35 percent of the Latino vote, which is concentrated in key swing states like Florida and New Mexico. This time around, his pollster has said, Bush needs to garner at least 40 percent. A poll released by the Pew Hispanic Center last week proved encouraging to his team, with 54 percent of Latinos approving of Bush's job performance and 37 percent saying they'd like him re-elected (compared with 47 percent backing a generic Democrat). On its surface, Bush's immigration proposal seems like an ingenious bid to build on that support. But given the complexity of the Hispanic constituency, there's no guarantee it will pay off at the polls.

For starters, immigration isn't necessarily a winning issue with Latinos. Studies show it usually ranks far below jobs, education and health care as top Hispanic concerns. It might appeal to a recent Mexican immigrant, but not a third-generation Latino or a Puerto Rican who's born a U.S. citizen. In fact, a 2002 survey found that 48 percent of registered Latino voters thought there were too many immigrants in the United States—in line with white attitudes. When immigration has galvanized Latinos, it has typically been in response to perceived attacks—like attempts in California to strip the undocumented of public services—not in response to pro-immigrant policies. A more obvious tactical shortcoming of the Bush proposal: its beneficiaries won't be voters for years, if ever and when they are, they'll most likely vote Democratic. Add to all this the difficulty of enacting immigration reform—with conservatives fuming about rewarding illegal behavior and Democrats pushing for permanent residency—and there's reason to question the electoral payoff of Bush's strategy.

Still, nobody's underestimating Karl Rove's math skills. Foreign -born Latinos— for whom the immigrant experience is still fresh— have swelled from about one fifth of Hispanic registered voters in 1988 to about half today, according to a poll by the New Democrat Network. "They don't have a history or legacy with a particular party," says NDN's Maria Cardona. "They swing harder than any other constituency in the American electorate." Bush's proposal also helps suppress a traditional Democratic attack—Republicans as immigrant bashers—by casting his party as welcoming and inclusive. Democrats " no longer can rely on fear as a mobilization tactic," says GOP consultant Mike Madrid. It remains to be seen whether viable legislation will emerge from what promises to be a contentious fight in Congress. But, Madrid says, "the fact that we're talking about that debate is a tactical victory already." Bush's Spanish may be broken, but he's certainly fluent in the language of politics.

HELP WANTED: A spot in Dallas where undocumented immigrants, whom Bush would grant legal status, wait for work.

At Harvard, skeptics rule

For a brief moment on campus, Iraq stirred the students.
But sadly, pessimism has regained its lead over passion here.

By Beccah Golubock Watson
Newsweek. January 19, 2004 issue.

As the Democratic presidential sweepstakes heats up, students at Harvard are greeting a parade of visiting candidates with polite smiles—and big yawns. To hear most of my classmates tell it, it doesn't much matter if the Democrats pick Dean or Clark or Kucinich or Moseley Braun. It's not just that people here are skeptical of anyone's chances of beating Bush; at today's Harvard, pessimism is always cooler than passion.

Roosevelts and Kennedys may have once walked these grounds, but it's hard to find students who think politicians can truly change the world. It's not that we're not passionate about our liberal politics. It's just that we're wary of looking foolish by being passionately liberal.

Sure, every once in a while Harvard dabbles in radicalism. Three years ago a group of students stormed the university president's office and waged a multiday sit-in, demanding a living wage for Harvard workers. Shaggy protesters built an unwieldy tent city inside stately Harvard Yard. When the university caved, the protesters went back to their dorms and apathy reigned once more. Now it's much more common to see a Harvard student complimenting president Larry Summers on his tennis game than challenging him on his policies.

It looked for a time like the war in Iraq might change things. Last spring, when President George W. Bush began dropping bombs on Baghdad, no one made cynical jokes or seemed embarrassed to talk openly about how they felt. My friends admitted they were scared, confused, anxious and angry. Eventually, thousands of students showed they were willing to act on their convictions, walking out of classes and filling the yard in protest.

For a brief moment, apathetic Harvard had become activist Harvard again. Today chaos may rule the day in Iraq, but things here have gotten pretty sedate again. Instead of protesting the war, students are dressing up and going to intimate " Evenings With the Candidates " in Harvard houses and swooning for the cameras at tapings of Chris Matthews's "Hardball Goes to Harvard" series. Kids who briefly muddied their feet and chanted against the war are now polishing their shoes and smiling noncommittally at the candidates.

The Democrats aren't doing much to keep our radical spirit alive. When Matthews asked John Kerry what his favorite movie was at one of the " Hardball " tapings, the Massachusetts senator seemed stumped. When he spoke in an undergraduate dorm, Wesley Clark kept finding awkward silence where he expected applause. And when Matthews asked Dean to name his favorite book, the front runner boldly plugged his own campaign biography.

So even as the country faces grave issues of war and peace, Harvard students are more worked up about what's on the dining-hall menu than they are about the White House race. Personally, I'm keeping my hopes up for a revival of passionate political activism. At cynical Harvard, optimism is an act of rebellion in and of itself.

Watson is a senior at Harvard College. She is one of five college journalists writing periodically about Campaign for NEWSWEEK and NEWSWEEK.COM

Too cool for school: Beccah Watson says students care more about ‘ Lord of the Rings ’ than about electing a president.

Another kind of warrior

Saudi television personality Rania al-Baz was beaten unconscious.
Then,"she did the unthinkable: she spoke out."

By Christopher Dickey and Faiza Ambah
Newsweek. May 3 issue

It was late Sunday and the kids were asleep," remembers Rania al-Baz, one of Saudi Arabia's few women television presenters. She and her husband were arguing, as they often did. " The next thing I knew he was strangling me," al-Baz told NEWSWEEK. " Then he threw me against the wall and banged my head down on the floor. He told me to say the Shahadah [the Muslim prayer of last rites] because I was going to die. I said it and fainted. The next thing I remember, I was in the hospital."

For many battered wives, and not only in Saudi Arabia, the story might have ended there. But because al-Baz, 29, is a celebrity in a country where many women aren't allowed to show their faces in public, and because she was barely recognizable with her features fractured in 13 places, somebody took her picture. More surprising still, the Saudi press published the gruesome image. Then, in the full glare of international publicity, al-Baz spoke out for her rights as a woman and a mother."I spoke out because I wanted [women] to know that they have rights under Sharia that protect them from domestic violence," says al-Baz. " I also want to say that one man beat me, but one hundred have stood by me. My boss, my colleagues at work, my friends, the man in the street." She had been battered before, but had not sued for divorce for fear that she might lose custody of her two kids. Now she tells her sons, 5 and 3 years old, that she fell down some steps, "and if you run without being careful, this is what happens."

Al-Baz's plight, and her protest, are emblematic of a broader struggle that is underway in Saudi society. It is not the stark conflict of forces that George W. Bush often envisions, between good and evil, freedom and oppression, Western-style democracy and dictatorship. It's a struggle within Islam over how to make Saudi Arabia a better Islamic society. People like al-Baz and her many supporters are pushing for more equitable laws in a society of the present, not one locked into an idealized vision of a medieval past. Conservatives are pushing back, and bin Ladenists are fighting a campaign of their own.

Days after al-Baz went public with her story, a suicide bomber attacked one of the Saudi security service's own administrative buildings, killing six people and wounding 148. The next night, police fought a running gun battle with suspected terrorists in a Jidda suburb. A claim of responsibility for the bombing, posted on a fundamentalist Web site, was couched in the language of desert justice. " There is not one house, neighborhood or tribe left that does not have a blood feud [with the royal family]," it declared.

Which forces are winning? Change in Saudi Arabia may be violent or it may come, says Rachel Bronson of the Council on Foreign Relations, "through consultations and signals" from the royal family. But those are often unclear, sometimes totally contradictory, and utterly frustrating for U.S. officials worried about the stability of world oil prices.

A survey of more than 15,000 Saudi men and women, conducted last year with government funds, suggested that a huge silent majority supports reforms promoted by Crown Prince Abdullah, including efforts to give women more legal rights (such as driver's licenses) and some tentative steps toward democracy with municipal elections. Indeed, as winter began there was a kind of Saudi spring. People were speaking out in the press, on the radio and on satellite TV channels. But in December, Prince Nayef, the Interior minister, warned a group of leading liberals that" their files were now with him," according to a man who attended the meeting. Nayef ordered them not to air their demands publicly, but in private discussions with the authorities. When Nayef's warning wasn't heeded, a dozen of the most prominent reformers were jailed. Three are still in prison.

The story of beautiful, battered Rania al-Baz hit the papers just as the reformers needed some inspiration. "The message I want to give is 'no to violence'," al-Baz told NEWSWEEK. With her husband having surrendered to police, she and her two boys are safe for the moment. But their struggle isn't over. A human-rights group has provided her with a lawyer to fight for her rights and everyone else's. At a time when a murderous minority is trying to seize power, many are hoping the silent majority isn't silenced once again.

Going Public: Television presenter Rania al-Baz, on the left in a recent file photo, is trying to highlight the plight of battered Saudi women. The picture on the right shows her lying in a hospital bed after her husband beat her unconscious.

Looking for a real leader

When it comes to talent at the top, Indonesians have to wait.

By Joe Cochrane
Newsweek International. March 8 issue.

 When she was appointed regent of the central Java district of Kebuman four years ago, Rustriningsih did a very unusual thing for an Indonesian official: she refused to take bribes. Instead, the 36-year-old, who like many Indonesians goes by one name, began building one of the country's cleanest and most transparent provincial governments. Today she is the most popular figure in her district of 1.2 million and the perfect candidate for national Parliament elections next month. The only problem is she's not running. " I would have limited powers to change things at the national level, "says Rustriningsih," but at the [provincial] level I am leading the fight against corruption."

The ouster of authoritarian president Suharto in 1998 filled many Indonesians with hope. A year later the country celebrated its first free election in four decades. But five years on, hope seems to have been replaced with resignation. Although the country has largely recovered from the 1997 financial crisis, Suharto's Golkar Party remains a key player in Parliament and the cabinet, the judiciary and civil service are still rife with corruption and the armed forces have regained their political influence n the capital, as well as economic clout in the provinces. Heading into the April 5 polls, and the nation's first direct presidential election in July, Indonesian voters remain stuck choosing among an entrenched group of national political figures largely associated with corruption, incompetence or human-rights abuses.

Consider the current crop of candidates: a former housewife with questionable leadership skills (President Megawati Sukarnoputri), a Muslim politician who once counted the country's top terrorist suspect as his friend (Vice President Hamzah Haz), a retired Army general indicted for war crimes by United Nations prosecutors in East Timor (former armed forces chief Wiranto), a former president removed for alleged corruption and incompetence (Abdurrahman Wahid) and a Parliament speaker who has been dogged by allegations of embezzlement (Akbar Tanjung). Some have already written off the upcoming polls in hope that new leadership will emerge for the next set of elections in 2009. " The field is not so inspiring," says Wimar Witoelar, a prominent political commentator. " It's more of the same people."

Some have already written off the polls, hoping new leaders will emerge in 2009.
The most enduring legacy of Suharto's 32-year rule may be this leadership vacuum. The strongman regularly had anyone who proved to be politically ambitious shunted aside. And the so-called democratic reformers who were ushered into power in 1999 have failed to cultivate a new generation of leaders, let alone clean house among the old political elite. Although successive governments have passed anti-corruption laws and created investigative commissions, they are considered paper tigers. Worse, under Megawati, all inquiries into the Suharto family—including of the man himself—were halted. Without strong political backing from Jakarta, it's hardly surprising that the reform movement collapsed or that more inspiring figures haven't risen from the grass roots. " In such a situation, it's very difficult to find new leaders," says political analyst Salim Said. "I do hope that two or three elections from now... we can have a leader who started from down below."

That's where some international donors are placing their bets. The World Bank is providing hundreds of millions of dollars in funding and assistance to local governments that, in their view, are seeking transparency, public participation and an end to corruption. Among Indonesia's 430 provincial districts, they've identified a small number of untainted, reform-minded regents — called bupati — whose good work they hope will spark a " trickle-up effect " that encourages clean government at the national level. For example, in Kebuman district, Rustriningsih hosts a daily radio call-in show and broadcasts her mobile-phone number so constituents can call up with complaints and suggestions. In Solok, south Sumatra, regent Gamawan Fauzi has sacked several civil servants for corruption, and has begun home mail delivery to rural villages. He regularly appears on Jakarta talks shows and attends international anticorruption conferences. Says Rustriningsih, " I want to change everything by my own hand, so one day I can be influential on the national level."

It will take more than savvy public relations to shake up Indonesian politics. Most provincial officials are beholden to their parties, and are required to " donate " a portion of their salaries in exchange for posts. But that may be changing, too. Beginning next year, provincial regents will be directly elected, which, analysts say, will both broaden their political base and make them less dependent on party connections. And that may finally give politicians like Rustriningsih the chance to shake things up — for good.

With Peter Jannsen.

Latin America's new proxy war

Washington has gone all-out to stop Chávez from winning [a Security Council seat].
He's been personally campaigning for months.

By Jorge G. Castañeda
Newsweek International

 The summit of nonaligned countries held last week 2in Havana was an occasion for all sorts of things: speculating on Fidel Castro's health, supporting all the " worthwhile " causes in the world—from Iran's nuclear program to Bolivia's stalled natural - gas nationalization — and predictably, bashing George W. Bush. This last contact sport is beginning to give traditional anti-Americanism a bad name; it is vicious, uninterrupted and, unfortunately, not often easy to rebut. But the summit also provided a marvelous opportunity for one of the stars of the show — Venezuela's Hugo Chávez — to lobby strong and hard for his cause of the day, getting his country elected as one of Latin America's two nonpermanent members of the United Nations Security Council for the 2007-08 term.

The Non-Aligned Movement has well over 100 members; all of them vote in the U.N. General Assembly, which, sometime next month, will elect Argentina's replacement as one of Latin America's two representatives on the Council. Chávez wants the seat badly. Next year there is another dramatic battle shaping up: Turkey, Iceland and Austria will compete for two of the three European slots. But the main event this year is the contest between Venezuela and Guatemala for the Latin American post. This is, in fact, a proxy battle between Bush and Chávez. Washington has gone all-out to stop Chávez from winning; the Venezuelan has been personally campaigning for months all over the globe, doling out petrodollars, oil and gas projects, schools and hospitals as he jets from capital to capital in Africa, Asia and his home region.

A two-thirds majority is needed to win; that's 128 votes to triumph, or 64 votes to defeat one's rival. The voting goes on until a candidate reaches the magic number; there is an unwritten rule that after three rounds, previous commitments are withdrawn and everything goes. Actually, everything goes most of the time: promises are broken, votes are bought and sold and betrayal is ever-present. All of this occurs, of course, because the stakes are high, and higher in Latin America than at any time since 1979, when Fidel Castro attempted to win the regional seat, claiming that Cuba, being chairman then — as now— of the Non-Aligned Movement, was entitled to membership. The United States blocked Castro, using Colombia as a stalking horse, and Mexico was elected as a compromise candidate. This time, things might be more complicated.

The risk for the United States is real. Chávez would probably occupy the seat personally for extended periods at a time, in lieu of his permanent representative or his foreign minister. He would use that magnificent pulpit to glorify his Bolivarian Revolution, to help his friends in Latin America and to thwart his enemies — Bush, incoming president Felipe Calderón in Mexico, and Colombian President Alvaro Uribe. Most significant, he would get directly involved in many of the issues the Security Council will have to address in the next two years, including sanctions against Iran. No wonder Washington and other capitals are terrified at the prospect.

But it is not clear that there is much they can do about it. Guatemala claims it has committed votes. Attrition —a euphemism for promises unkept— and Chávez's oil-fueled largesse mean that number is likely to shrink. The only chance to keep Chávez out of Dag Hammarskjold Plaza is to lock in a blocking third of the votes indefinitely, and hope that, like 37 years ago, the Latin American group will seek a compromise.

It won't be easy: Cuba, Brazil and Argentina all support Venezuela. Even Chile probably will, and the only major countries behind Guatemala are Mexico and Colombia. Chávez has not helped himself by wondering out loud in Havana whether Mexico's elections were free and fair, and whether he will recognize Calderon's victory. The question is, though , if anyone else in the region wants to face his wrath and meddling by finding a way out of the quagmire. Right now only Uruguay and the Dominican Republic qualify as acceptable alternatives; but the last thing Presidents Leonel Fernández or Tabaré Vázquez probably want is to mess with Hugo.

So the betting right now is on Venezuela, and against Washington. It would be an uphill fight for the United States under any circumstances, but it's almost an impossible one given George Bush's unpopularity in what was once known as the Third World. Most of its members just met in Havana, and they don't like 43; they don't like Israel, they don't like Tony Blair and they certainly don't like U.S. policy in Iraq and Iran. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton has his work cut out for him.

Turkey: Between East and West

Turkey is perfectly poised to spearhead America's attempts to reform the Middle East. But Ankara has good reasons not to.

By Owen Matthews (With Sami Kohen in Istanbul)
Newsweek Magazine

Turkey's place at center stage for this week's NATO summit is more than symbolic. Beyond Iraq, both the United States and Europe have one dominant policy mission--to break the logjam of political dysfunction in the Middle East. Turkey seems the perfect broker: the country is Islamic but secular; despite ongoing bombings like the ones last week that killed four people, it's relatively peaceful; it has abandoned its police-state past, and it's run by a moderate, Islamic-leaning government that has shown a strong interest in reforming the wider Muslim world.
But when U.S. President George W. Bush presses Ankara to get onboard with Washington's so-called Greater Middle East Project, he's likely to be gently rebuffed. Turkey has long seen itself as a bridge between East and West, and has been engaging with its Islamic neighbors more than it has for a generation. But Ankara policymakers say the country is not going to do so on Washington's terms. Turkey favors Europe's softly-softly approach to the Middle East. That's not just because the country wants to join the EU, but because the Turks are convinced that any project carrying a U.S. stamp is a nonstarter in the region. (On Saturday, in fact, three Turks were taken hostage in Iraq and threatened with beheading unless their countrymen stopped cooperating with U.S. – led forces in Iraq.)

Sources at NATO headquarters say that Bush’s radical plans for reforming the Middle East have so little support that they aren’t even going to be mentionated in the end – of – summit communiqué. Instead the project, now renamed the Istanbul Cooperative Initiative, may be tackled in a separate document, and even that “will be an expression of support, but not engagement,” says one European ambassador to NATO.
So how come Turkey, for decades a closer ally of Washington than of Brussels, is siding with the Bush skeptics? Domestic opposition to the U.S. occupation of Iraq remains strong.

“Being an ally does not mean that you accept everything,” warned Turkish Foreign Minister Abdul Iah Gul as he cold - shouldered a recent U.S. request for access to Turkish military bases. Ankara’s top foreign- policy objective is getting a start date for talks to join the EU at the Union’s December summit- and siding with the Unites States at this delicate point in negotiations is unlikely to win many friends in Brussels. And many Turkish officials are simply convinced that the American plan, with its emphasis on elections, won’t work. “Democracy, for many Arab countries from Algeria to Egypt, may mean power for fundamentalist forces,” warns retired diplomat Yuksel Soylemez.

That’s not to say that Turkey isn’t in favor of many of the things Washington wants to encourage. Both Gul and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Endrogan have made a point of calling for the liberation of women, political reform and freedom of speech across the region. But, says a senior European diplomat in Ankara, the Turks have decided that “being seen as mouthpiece of the White House” isn’t likely to win them much of a hearing. “If the U.S. sticks to the support for change and does not give the impression that it has other designs about the region, Turkey can work with Washington and others who want to help,” says a senior Turkish official- hardly a ringing endorsement.

That said, Turkey is anxious to exert more influence. Ankara pushed hard for the nomination of a Turk, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, to be the new secretary – general of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. And Iraq, officials have expresses a more flexible approach to the idea of a federal Kurdish entity in the north, by at least entertaining the possibility that one could develop. The bigger question is whether Middle Eastern nations will be any more open to listening to the Turks- who under the Ottomans ruled much of the region- than the Americans. “Turkey is simultaneously respected and feared,” says Soylemez. In any case, warns Gul, change imposed from outside is doomed to failure. “The initiative for change and reform in the Islamic world should come from within,” he says. “Their own intellectuals and civil society must lead.” With the Turks giving them a nudge in the right direction.

TWO WORLDS: Turkey balances both the secular and the Islamic

A one-way ticket

Fed up with political and economic restrictions, Iranian expat workers are among the least likely in the world to return home.

By Babak Dehghanpisheh.
Newsweek.

Not every country benefits when workers go abroad in search of jobs. Each year approximately 200,000 Iranians, many of them highly educated, leave the country for the United States, Canada, Europe and Australia. The International Monetary Fund ranks Iran as having the highest rate of brain drain in the world. The reasons aren't difficult to pinpoint: unemployment hovers around 20 percent and the inflation rate is roughly 15 percent. Government restrictions on investment severely limit business opportunities. In Teheran, university teachers and students frequently moonlight as cab drivers to make ends meet.

For young university graduates, many of whom have been exposed to Western culture through satellite television and the Internet, social restrictions in the Islamic Republic are the last straw. "The biggest reason for the brain drain is the lack of democracy in Iran," says Hamid Reza Jalaipour, a sociologist at Tehran University. " Young people feel their personal rights are threatened so they say good riddance to the hard-line clerics and decide to leave."

For the same reasons, very few return. Rana Ghahremanpour, 27, left Iran to pursue graduate studies in electrical engineering in the United States four years ago. At first she considered going back to Iran. " I used to think about it a lot," she says. "But with the present situation I don't want to go back. I know many [Iranians] who have sunk into life in the U.S.

In fact, so many university students have decided to leave in recent years that internal networks have sprung up to help them. Nariman Fernardin,47,is the dean of the engineering school at the University of Maryland. Farvadin, who left Iran at the height of the revolution in 1979, also acts as a facilitator: top graduates from Iran e-mail him resumes and he helps them navigate the maze of academic bureaucracy, search for financial aid and, occasionally, get in touch with colleagues. "The majority end up staying" says Farvadin. " Very few go back."

The loss of this talent pool is undoubtedly a set back for Iran. But in the short term, it could be worse if they stayed. Frustrated by lack of opportunity, these highly educated citizens could well contribute to an effective civil opposition. "If these 200.000 or so people weren't allowed to leave, Iran would explode," says economist Sayeed Leylaz. "The economy can't absorb them. And there would be more political and social problems."

Farz Nikoukar is one of those looking for a way out. After graduating with top marks from a Tehran University with an M.B.A. last year, Nikoukar, 28, sent out 50 resumes to Iranians firms. He landed only three interviews, so chose the next best option: hire a lawyer to help him press his case at the Canadian Embassy. He has his sights set on Montreal. "Even if you can find a Job [in Iran], It's difficult to have a good life," he says. Until that changes, Iran's intellectual outflow will produce few returns.

Friday, 11 September 2009

The importance of teaching English from the economic point of view

The economic importance of teaching English as a second language is related to the existence of the Anglophone countries like the United States and England which have an uncontested supremacy in this context.

The group of seven is like a club of the most powerful developed economies which control The World Bank, The International Monetary Fund, and the Interamerican Development Bank.

From the group of seven, four members of Anglophone countries are clearly dominated by the United States. This country within the organization is practically one of the most important countries with greater power to decide apparently to protect the members’ interests but, in fact, it only its own when it comes to taking decisions. In my opinion, this gives the U.S. dollar an overwhelming role of monopoly as international currency and, of course, the universal currency dictates or mandates the universal language.

(Taken from: Research in ESP by Francisco Santoyo, 2004)

Iran clock is ticking.

By Robert Parry
January 31, 2007.

While congressional Democrats test how far they should go in challenging George W. Bush’s war powers, the time may be running out to stop Bush from ordering a major escalation of the Middle East conflict by attacking Iran.

Military and intelligence sources continue to tell me that preparations are advancing for a war with Iran starting possibly as early as mid-to-late February. The sources offer some differences of opinion over whether Bush might cite a provocation from Iran or whether Israel will take the lead in launching air strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities.

But there is growing alarm among military and intelligence experts that Bush already has decided to attack and simply is waiting for a second aircraft carrier strike force to arrive in the region – and for a propaganda blitz to stir up some pro-war sentiment at home.

One well-informed U.S. military source called me in a fury after consulting with Pentagon associates and discovering how far along the war preparations are. He said the plans call for extensive aerial attacks on Iran, including use of powerful bunker-busting ordnance.

Another source with a pipeline into Israeli thinking said the Iran war plan has expanded over the past several weeks. Earlier thinking had been that Israeli warplanes would hit Iranian nuclear targets with U.S. forces in reserve in case of Iranian retaliation, but now the strategy anticipates a major U.S. military follow-up to an Israeli attack, the source said.

Both sources used the same word “crazy” in describing the plan to expand the war to Iran. The two sources, like others I have interviewed, said that attacking Iran could touch off a regional – and possibly global – conflagration.“It will be like the TV show ‘24’,” the American military source said, citing the likelihood of Islamic retaliation reaching directly into the United States.

Though Bush insists that no decision has been made on attacking Iran, he offered similar assurances of his commitment to peace in the months before invading Iraq in 2003. Yet leaked documents from London made clear that he had set a course for war nine months to a year before the Iraq invasion.

In other words, Bush’s statements that he has no plans to "invade" Iran and that he’s still committed to settle differences with Iran over its nuclear program diplomatically should be taken with a grain of salt.

There is, of course, the possibility that the war preparations are a game of chicken to pressure Iran to accept outside controls on its nuclear program and to trim back its regional ambitions. But sometimes such high-stakes gambles lead to miscalculations or set in motion dynamics that can't be controlled.

You Will Die

The rapidly deteriorating situation in Iraq is seen as another factor pressing on Bush to act quickly against Iran.

Other sources with first-hand knowledge of conditions in Iraq have told me that the U.S. position is even more precarious than generally understood. Westerners can’t even move around Baghdad and many other Iraqi cities except in armed convoys.

Normally, winning the hearts and minds of a target population requires a commitment to move among the people and work on public action projects, from building roads to improving the judicial system. But all that requires some measure of political goodwill and personal trust.

Given the nearly four years of U.S. occupation and the devastation that Iraq has suffered, not even the most talented American counterinsurgency specialists can expect to overcome the hatred swelling among large segments of Iraqi society.
Bush’s “surge” strategy of conducting more military sweeps through more Iraqi neighborhoods– knocking down doors, gunning down hostile Iraqis and dragging off others to detention camps –is not likely to assuage hard feelings.

(This text has been adapted by the authors of this book for pedagogical purposes.)

Still hoping for an accord.

NEGOTIATION. Meeting to be held in Caracas.

ABN and DJ Staff


President Hugo Chávez said on Friday that the meeting he will hold in the coming days with an envoy of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC, under its Spanish acronym) will help reach more than a humanitarian accord.

"It will be a good meeting in which we will find several alternatives, beyond the humanitarian accord. I hope it will be the path to peace," Chávez said from the Amazonian city of Manaos, Brazil.

After meeting his Ecuadorian counterpart, Rafael Correa, the Venezuelan President said that he still does not know who the FARC representative will be, but he said the meeting will take place in Caracas. The date opposed by the guerrilla group is October 8.

Chávez also stressed that it is necessary to find conditions to hold a meeting with the FARC leader, Manuel " Sureshot " Marulanda.

"Marulanda said he wants to hold a meeting with me and I want to meet him too. But we have to find the conditions. He said the meeting must take place in Colombia, but Uribe said it is not advisable and I respect his decision because he is the President of Colombia," Chávez said.

Chávez said that next week he will meet in Caracas with a group of American actors, among them Kevin Spacey, who wants to help in the negotiation process.


Chávez made an emphasis in his determination to reach the humanitarian accord.

However, he warned that the positions described as "immovable" must be evaluated with respect by both sides.

He said he has received support messages for the entire world, even the African continent for his mediation role between the FARC and Uribe's government.

He said that the U.S. government, through its ambassador is in Bogotá,"said that the U.S. government supports the process carried out to reach the exchange of hostages for guerrilla prisoners."

He said that he will soon meet with the relatives of the three Americans held captive by the FARC. Chávez said that next week he will meet in Caracas with a group of American actors, among them Kevin Spacey, who wants to help in the negotiation process.

He stressed that the Colombian senator, Piedad Córdoba, will meet Friday with the relatives of the American victims.

She will also meet in the American Congress with democrat representatives and maybe with presidential pre-candidates of that country.

The changing World Order: Authoritarian Governments: Hindrance or Help?

World order and domestic politics affect each other. For example, the war on terrorism has reshaped U.S. domestic politics, notably in the dramatic, " round the flag" boost in President Bush's popularity. The bipartisan cohesiveness that emerged in the months after September 11 in turn affected world order by increasing U.S. willingness and ability to take military action abroad. Conversely, partisan divisions that may emerge in the 2002 and 2004 elections might make U.S. policy makers more wary of risky military actions.

Similarly, the changing world order closely connects with the issue of democracy in the Arab and Muslim worlds. Bahrain in 2002 changed from an emirate to a constitutional monarchy with an elected parliament —a modest step towards democracy. Saudi Arabia's lack of democracy has received new attention. The pace of democratization in the Middle East and South Asia may shape the potential of Islamic revolutionaries to undermine the present interstate system (see Thomas Friedman's Op Ed in the special section of this book). Authoritarian governments in many countries in these regions stifle political expression, often leaving the mosque as the prime gathering point for opposition and revolution as a main alternative given a lack of other political reform outlets. In Iran in recent years, modest democratization has strengthened moderates, and without question greater democratization would make Iran's policies less radical, not more so.

Yet, in other countries, the United States and other great powers rely on authoritarian governments to suppress religious extremists who support terrorism. (Similarly, in the Cold War, Western powers supported authoritarian governments that suppressed communists.) Can these governments loosen their grip without potentially bringing extremists to power in states like Saudi Arabia or Pakistan? When Algeria democratized a decade ago, Islamic parties were poised to win until the military seized control again. Could the people of some country vote an Osama bin Laden into power and give him the keys to the interstate club, or even the nuclear club, the way Germans voted Hitler in during the 1930s?

So is democracy a good thing or a bad thing in the Middle East and South Asia? On what does it depend?

(Text taken from Understanding International Relations, 1994; p. 175)

Acculturation

African traits were replaced or modified by European traits. Almost all African traits have been influenced by European culture, especially in the cities.
The people in the cities have been most affected by modernization in Kenya.

In 1886, Kenya came under the control of the British. Kenya was ruled by the British for almost 80 years. British laws became the law of Kenya. English became the official language. The schools that were start were taught in English.

Contact with the British brought many changes to African culture. This contact with the British is an example of innovations coming from outside the culture. This kind of innovation is called acculturation, because Africans and British came into direct contact. Acculturation is the change that takes place in a culture over a period of time as a result of contact between different cultures.

In Kenya, there were European settlers and British officials. Kenyans came into contact with Europeans in government work in factories, and on the farms. Many new traits came to Kenya through acculturation.

Why have Africans wanted to change? If you can drive a car to work, would you want to walk? If you can have a refrigerator, would you want to cool your meat in spring? If you can have a pair of shoes, would you want to always go barefooted? People everywhere want to live better.

The problem, sometimes, is that people from other cultures use to impose its political power to subdue acculturated people to avoid they express their ideas openly and freely. Living better must be related to making and more things. People all over the world want to have enough food to eat, enough clothes to wear, comfortable houses to live, and be treated as human beings. Africans are no different from other people. They want many of the same things other people want.

The direction of acculturation was largely one way: European traits replaced or changed African traits, but African traits had little impact on European. The new traits have helped in the modernization of Kenya. Modernization in Kenya has resulted in the replacement of African traits by European traits.

Acculturation has been stronger in the urban areas. Here the three major forces, nationalism, urbanization, and industrialization, have affected more people for the longest length of time.

(Written by Elmer Clauson and Marion Rice in Discourse Analysis: Strategies for evaluating the written text by Marbella Delgado,2003)

Decision making.

The foreign policy process is a process of decision making. States take actions because people in governments choose those actions. People whose job it is to make decisions about international relations decision makers have to go through the same kinds of processes, in one way or another, that anyone would go through even in deciding what to eat for dinner.

Decision making is a steering process in which adjustments are made as a result of feed-back from the outside world. Decisions are carried out by actions taken to change the world, and then information from the world is monitored to evaluate the effects of actions. These evaluations along with information about other, independent changes in the environment —go into the next round of decisions.

The steering process, with its external feedback, is based on the goals of the decision maker. Along the way to these goals, decision makers set objectives as discrete steps to be reached. Objectives fall along a spectrum from core, long-term objectives to very short-term, practical objectives.

(Text taken from Understanding International Relations, 1994; p 157)

Critical Reading

Critical reading is defined as a process characterized by “careful and exact evaluation and judgment ” or “ to judge a matter severely”. This kind of critical analysis must 6be taught with reading material used in the classroom. Critical reading goes beyond the basic prerequisite of general comprehension skill by making fuller use of analytical thinking processes. This prerequisite is the need to determine from many sources the best thinking on a point in question or area of study.

According to many reading authorities, critical reading skills should be taught through the newspaper whose editorial policy reflects one part’s point of view or whose slant on the news tends toward the sensational limit degree to which reading materials can be critically analyzed.

Most reading teachers think that critical reading skills should begin to be taught at the preschool reading readiness level. Here pictures can be interpreted and put in sequence, details noted, generalizations made, and relationship determined.

Critical reading skills must continue to be taught throughout the elementary and high school years, as one never really arrives at perfection in these skills. Basic to continuing instruction is the necessity for numerous opportunities for students to express their ideas openly and freely.

Critical analysis of material cannot be conducted in threatening situations in which the teacher does not allow for differences of opinion and belief.

(Written by Arnold Cheney in: "Discourse analysis: Strategies for evaluating the written text" by Marbella Delgado, 1993)

Lowest poverty rate in 15 years.

According to two new studies not only has Brazil’s poverty rate reached a 15 year low but there has also been a reduction in income inequality.

EFE News Service

RIO DE JANEIRO  –

Brazil’s poverty rate reached a 15-year low in 2006, according to two studies that also show a reduction in income inequality, though the giant South American country remains plagued by a huge gap between rich and poor.

The analysis of the data reveals an increase in Brazilians’ income in election years and the positive impact that social policies have on reducing poverty.

The conclusions are based on the analysis of recent data gathered for the national household survey conducted by the government’s IBGE statistics institute.

Brazil is going through “ an historic period ” in terms of poverty reduction, said Marcelo Cortes Neri, director of the Social Policy Center of the Getulio Vargas Foundation, who added that in 2006 the number of people living in extreme poverty in Brazil fell by 6 million.

Despite that, there are still 36.2 million people who live on less than 125 reais ($65) per month, the poverty threshold, according to the foundation, which is one of Brazil’s leading think tanks.

The percentage of Brazilians living in extreme poverty in 2006 was 19.31 percent, compared to 35.31 percent in 1993, the year before the launch of a new currency, the real, in what turned out to be a successful effort to tame Brazil’s chronic inflation.

The percentage of Brazilians living in extreme poverty in 2006 was 19.31 percent, compared to 35.31 percent in 1993. A lot of the reduction is due to government aid programs.

Brazil is going through “an historic period” in terms of poverty reduction. But the reduction in extreme poverty has occurred in fits and starts, Neri said, noting that progress on that front in election years has been coupled with setbacks in the following years.

Neri, who on Wednesday presented his analytical study at a press conference, said he was convinced that in 2007 “that argument is going to fall apart” and that the percentage of people living in extreme poverty will continue to decline. He said that a large part of the advance in the fight against poverty has been due to government aid programs like the “Bolsa Familia,” which has been criticized by the opposition as welfare, and investment in education from previous governments that is now beginning to bear fruit.

He said that those programs have less electoral impact because they benefit children, but at the same time they help to improve the standard of living of families with much greater efficacy than increases in the minimum wage.

“Every real spent on the Bolsa Familia (program) reduces poverty 2 1/2 times more than a (comparable) increase in the minimum wage,” he said.

Similar conclusions about poverty were drawn by Sonia Rocha, a researcher with the IETS Labor and Society Research Institute, who analyzed the statistics along regional lines taking into account differences in the cost of living.

According to Rocha, whose conclusions were published Thursday by the daily Folha de Sao Paulo, the rate of indigence fell from 6.8 percent of the population 91in 2005 to 5.7 percent last year.

Poverty in 2006, according to her study, affected 26.9 percent of Brazilians, the lowest level since 1987, the first year of her analysis.

The results reflect improvements in the job market, which has led to an increase in gross salaries, according to both studies, which agree that the income of Brazil’s poorest citizens has grown proportionally more than that of the richest.

Why the United States invaded Iraq and is now thinking about invading Iran.

By Dr. Abbas Bakhtiar*

On April 28, the IAEA released its report on Iran. The IAEA reported that: "the Agency cannot make a judgment about, or reach a conclusion on, future compliance or intentions." The report came as no surprise to those who have been following the ongoing dispute between Iran, United States and the IAEA.

The United States, for quite some time now, has been accusing Iran of trying to develop nuclear weapons and Iran has been insisting that its intentions are peaceful and that it is only interested in peaceful use of the nuclear energy. Iran, to allay the international community's fear, froze its enrichment program and started a series of negotiations with the U.K., Germany, and France. However, without the United States these negotiations were not going to produce any results, since it was only the United States that could address the Iranian's national security concerns.

Iranians seeing themselves surrounded by American forces wanted a security guarantee that United States would not invade Iran, something that United States was not prepared to give. So the negotiations with the European three failed and Iran resumed its enrichment program. Iran was threatened with Security Council and even invasion without any effect. Now once again there is talk of a Security Council resolution under article 7 and continuous threats of invasion. There have even been talks of tactical nuclear strike on suspected Iranian nuclear facilities.

All these events are reminiscent of the negotiations and threats preceding the invasion of Iraq. The unfolding events are so similar that it makes one wonder if the Iraq scenario is not being used as a template for Iran. And with what has come to light since the Iraq invasion, we have to assume that like Iraq, the decision to invade Iran has already been taken, and that the E.U. Three negotiations and the IAEA are being used to prepare the public for that event. There are already reports of increased U.S. provocations along Iranian borders such as flying unmanned surveillance flight over Iran, and the insertion of commandos into Iran for intelligence gathering and other activities. The talk of invasion is also accompanied by war games. For example on April 14, USA Today reported: "Amid rising tensions between the United States and Iran over the future of Iran's nuclear program, the Pentagon is planning a war game in July so officials can explore options for a crisis involving Iran." [1]

But this war game is not the first of its kind. According to William M. Arkin of the Washington Post, "In early 2003, even as U.S. forces were on the brink of war with Iraq, the Army had already begun conducting an analysis for a full-scale war with Iran. The analysis, called TIRANNT, for "theatre Iran near term," was coupled with a mock scenario for a Marine Corps invasion and a simulation of the Iranian missile force. U.S. and British planners conducted a Caspian Sea war game around the same time. And Bush directed the U.S. Strategic Command to draw up a global strike war plan for an attack against Iranian weapons of mass destruction. All of this will ultimately feed into a new war plan for "major combat operations" against Iran that military sources confirm now exists in draft form." [2]

But why did the United States attack Iraq and why is she so keen on attacking Iran now? We now know that from the beginning, this administration was looking for any excuse to invade Iraq. Washington has, over time, given a number of different reasons for invading Iraq: starting with Iraq's developing nuclear weapons, to war on terror, to spreading democracy in the Middle East. All these reasons have proven to be false. Iraq did not possess any Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD); and did not have any link to Al Qaeda. And instead of democracy, Iraqis have had to endure Abu Ghraib, car bombs, and shortage of basic services such as electricity, clean water, and health care. None of the ministries are functioning properly and in addition Iraq has to deal with half a million displaced people. There is also talk of a partitioning of Iraq. [3] On top of all this, one may affirm the Iraqis now face a possible bloody civil war.

After spending over 320 billion dollars for Iraq war (officially so far) and with no end in sight, why is this administration insisting in starting another catastrophic war in the Middle East?

There have been a number of theories put forward by various groups and individuals.

Crusade –some Muslims think that United States has started a crusade against Islam and is determined to vanquish any and all countries that stand in its way.
Oil Reserves -- There are other groups who think that with the oil reserves diminishing fast, United States is trying to corner all the reserves and supplies for itself, thereby ensuring its dominant future economic position in the world.
China –There are others who think that an invasion of Iraq and targeting of Iran is part a geo-political move by United States to block China's emergence as a world power by restricting its access to oil. We should also consider this argument.
Israel - Finally there are those that argue that the United States is doing the bidding of Israel and getting rid of those that may challenge Israel's hegemony in the Middle East in the future.

The answer probably contains some of all of the above.

Comparisons with currently developing countries.


I think that the NDCs were institutionally much less advanced in those times that the currently developing countries are at similar stages of development. To make this point, levels of development of then-developing NDCs need to be compared with today’s developing countries. Tabl e 3.7 compares the per capita incomes of the NDCs during the XIX and early XX centuries (in 1990 international dollars) with the 1992 incomes of today’s developing countries. In 15my opinion, this is only a very rough-and-ready comparison, given that there are well known problems with using income figures to measure a country’s level of development, especially when it involves using historical statistics over two centuries. However, the table does give a rough idea as to where the NDCs were they were developing, in relation to those of today’s developing countries.

The comparison shows that, in the 1820s, most of the NDCs were, broadly speaking, at a level of development somewhere between Bangladesh ( §720 per capita income) and Egypt ( §1, 927 per capita income) of today – such a group includes countries like Burma (Myannmar), Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Nigeria, India and Pakistan. By 1875, most NDCs had moved beyond the Nigeria –India level of income, but even the richest ones (the UK, New Zealand and Australia) were at the level of today’s China ( §3, 098)or Peru ( §3,232). The rest including USA, Germany and France, were between today’s Pakistan ( §1,642) and Indonesia ( §2,749.

By 1913, the wealthiest NDCs (the UK, the USA, Australia and New Zeeland had reached the level of the richer of today’s developing countries (for example, Brazil, Mexico, Colombia and Thailand). However, the majority, from Finland to France and Austria, were still at the level of today’s middle income developing countries (such as the Philippines, Morocco, Indonesia, China and Peru)

Once that NDCs in earlier times had relatively low levels of institutional development compared to the countries that are at comparable levels of development today. For example, the UK in 1820 was at a somewhat higher level of development than India today, but it did not have many of even the most ‘basic’ institutions that exist in India, such as universal suffrage ( the UK did not at that point even have universal male suffrage) , a central bank, income tax, generalized limited liability, securities regulations.

Similarly, in 1875, Italy was at a level of development comparable to Pakistan today. However, it did not have universal male suffrage, a professional bureaucracy, even a remotely independent and professional judiciary, a central bank with a note issue monopoly or competition law – institutions that Pakistan has had for decades.

To give another example, the USA in 1913 was a level of development similar to that of Mexico today, yet its level of institutional development was well behind: women were still formally disenfranchised, as de facto were blacks and other ethnic minorities in many parts of the country. It had been just over a decade since a federal bankruptcy law had appeared (1898) and barely two decades since the country recognized foreigners’ copy rights in 1891. At this stage, moreover, the USA still had a highly -incomplete central banking system, while income tax had only just come into being (1913), and the establishment of a meaningful competition law had to wait until the Clayton Act of 1914. There was also no federal regulation on federal securities trading or on child labour, and what little state legislation existed in these areas was of low quality and very poorly enforced.

From these examples the conclusion is that in the early days of their economic development, the NDCs were operating with much less developed institutional today’s developing at comparable levels of development. Needless to say the level of institutional development in the NDCs fell well short of the even higher ‘ global standards ’ to which today’s developing countries are being told to conform.

A victory for the empire

The president declined to talk about negotiations with the FARC until he had met Lula, who has offered Brazil's territory to hold talks.

He rather referred to Venezuela’s entrance into Mercosur, accusing the United States of trying to impede it.

Michael Astor | The Associated Press

MANAUS, Brazil – The Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez on Thursday accused the United States of standing in the way of closer ties between Latin American nations.

Chávez, a staunch critic of Washington, said that if Venezuela is denied entry to South America's Mercosur trade bloc that it would be "a victory for the empire," in allusion to the United States.

Chávez arrived in this Amazon city of 1 million people for a meeting with Brazilian President Luiz Ignacio Lula da Silva, where the two were to discuss issues from joint energy projects to peace negotiations in Colombia.

The two leaders are opponents of U.S. -backed efforts for a Free Trade Area of the Americas that would stretch from Canada to Chile. But Venezuela's bid to join Mercosur is encountering resistance from lawmakers in Brazil who must ratify the expansion.

Meanwhile, Silva may offer Brazilian territory as neutral ground to help Chávez mediate a prisoner exchange between the Colombian government and that country's 1leftist rebels, a spokesman for Silva said. But Chávez declined to talk about those negotiations until after he had met with Silva.

Chávez is attempting to negotiate an exchange of imprisoned Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, guerrillas for rebel-held hostages, including three U.S. defense contractors and former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt, a French-Colombian citizen.

Politics. Chávez, in Brazil, says United States opposes Latin American integration.

Upon arriving at the Hotel Tropical, Chávez played down problems with Venezuela's complying with Mercosur's tariff norms that has kept the customs union from ratifying the country's full membership.

So far, Argentina and Uruguay have ratified Venezuela's entry in the group while Brazil and Paraguay have not.

Chávez said Venezuela wanted to share its immense reserves of crude oil and natural gas with Brazil and other countries in the region because " the world was entering an energy crisis" and that Brazil only had enough natural gas reserves to last 10 more years.

Silva and Chávez were to discuss a proposed natural gas pipeline spanning South America. and the Bank of the South, a development bank Chávez envisions as a home-grown alternative to U.S.-based lenders such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

President Rafael Correa planned to join the talks Thursday evening. |||

A moving forward to Integration

INTEGRATION. Presidents agree to create two Brazilian-Venezuelan joint ventures and to assign the pipeline’s construction.


A moving forward to integration.

One of the two joint ventures created will operate a crude oil field in Venezuela and the other one a refinery in Brazil.

Michael Astor | AP

MANAUS –Brazil and Venezuela agreed to forge ahead with two joint ventures between their state-run oil companies and a natural gas pipeline that would stretch across the Amazon rainforest.

President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Venezuela's Hugo Chávez on Thursday signed a series of accords to speed the projects that had been agreed upon earlier but had gotten bogged down in bureaucracy. "With these partnerships we are showing that South America can resolve its energy problems," Silva said.

Outlining the joint ventures between state oil companies, Chávez said one company would operate Carabobo I, an extra-heavy oil field in Venezuela's Orinoco Basin. Petróleos de Venezuela SA, PDVSA, will provide 60 percent of the capital for the Carabobo project, with the remainder coming from Petróleo Brasileiro SA, Petrobras.

Lula expressed his commitment to pursuit the approval of Venezuela's entrance into Mercosur. Another company would operate an oil refinery in the Brazilian state of Pernambuco with 60 percent of the capital coming from Petrobras and 40 percent from PDVSA.

In December 2005, Silva and Chávez laid the refinery's cornerstone but cooperation between the two companies stalled and Petrobras recently began talking about building it without Venezuelan help.

Chávez called the projects " the nerve of (South American) integration," adding that they would " shield (Silva) from an energy crisis." Silva also said they would soon select a company to develop a project for a natural gas pipeline from Venezuela to Brazil's northeast.

He expressed his willingness to work in order to assure that Brazil's congress would ratify Venezuela as a full member of the Southern Cone Common Market, or Mercosur.

"With these partnerships we are showing that South America can resolve its energy problems."

The two leaders are opponents of U.S.-backed efforts for a Free Trade Area of the Americas. But Venezuela's bid to join Mercosur is encountering resistance from lawmakers in Brazil who must ratify the expansion. So far, Argentina and Uruguay have ratified Venezuela's entry in the group while Brazil and Paraguay have not.

Foreign visitors are to be fingerprinted.


WASHINGTON – Foreign visitors arriving at U.S. airports or seaports beginning Jan. 1, 2004, will have their travel documents scanned, fingerprints and photos taken and identification checked against terrorist watch-lists.

Homeland Security undersecretary Asa Hutchinson released details on Monday of the department’s new U.S. Visitor and Immigration Status Indication Technology, or U.S. VISIT, that will check the comings and goings of certain foreign travelers. The checks will apply to people who arrive in this country carrying visas, which last year was about 60 percent or 23 million of the foreign visitors, said Hutchinson, who oversees Border and Transportation Security.

“In 99.9 percent of the cases, the visitor will simply be wished a good day or sent on their way,” Hutchinson said in a speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a think tank. “But with that small percentage of hits, our country will be made much safer and our immigration system will be given a foundation of integrity that has been lacking for too long.”

Also as part of the program, Hutchinson said the department has created an Office of Compliance that will analyze all the information collected from visitors and refer any requiring follow up to investigators.

(Taken from the Daily Journal)

The Iran option that isn't on the table

By Vali Nasr and Ray Takeyh
Thursday, February 8, 2007.


As Iran crosses successive nuclear demarcations and mischievously intervenes in Iraq, the question of how to address the Islamic republic is once more preoccupying Washington. Economic sanctions, international ostracism, military strikes and even support for hopeless exiles are all contemplated with vigor and seriousness. One option, however, is rarely assessed: engagement as a means of achieving a more pluralistic and responsible government in Tehran.

The all-encompassing nuclear debate comes as Iran's political landscape is changing once again. As America became reconciled to a monolithic Iran, represented by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his brand of rambunctious politics, the results from December's local elections suggest Iranians were doing otherwise. Ahmadinejad's defiant rhetoric and populist posturing did not impress the Iranians who turned out in large numbers to elect city councils and members of the Assembly of Experts. Voters favored pragmatic conservatives and reformers who oppose their president's policies abroad and his economic programs at home. Despite this show of dissent, though, it would be a mistake to assume that Iran's regime is about to fall or that a democratic spring is looming.

Iran has long appeared ready for democracy. It has a literate, youthful population that is immersed in world culture, is at home on the internet, is keen to engage the West and is above the anti-American anger that dominates the Arab street. No other Middle Eastern country has as much civic activism or a population that has voted as often in elections at various levels. But positive social and cultural indices have so far not translated into a political opening. Iranian society may be ready to embrace democracy, but Iranian politics is not ready to accommodate it.

Iran does not have an organized pro-democracy movement. The reformers who were swept to power in 1997 never coalesced around a coherent platform, nor did they produce a political party. Their movement inspired activism and student protests, and it changed the style and language of politics, but its lack of organization ultimately cost it the presidency in 2005. Reformism was popular but politically ineffective.

The clerical regime has also proved to be enterprising in facing demands for reform, particularly by using elections to manage opposition within the bounds of the Islamic republic. Economic isolation, supported by international sanctions, has kept the private sector weak, which has in turn denied supporters of change levers they could use to pry open the regime. The public sector accounts for more than 80 percent of the Iranian economy, and the constitution gives the clerical leadership most of the power. The problem facing democracy is not so much the state's theocratic nature as it is the enormous domination it enjoys over the economy, society and politics. For democracy to succeed, the state's domination of the economy and society must be reduced.

For too long, Washington has thought that a policy of coercion and sanctions applied to Iran would eventually yield a responsible and representative regime. Events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe suggest that containment eventually generates sufficient pressure to force autocratic elites to accommodate both international mandates and the aspirations of their restless constituents. Ironically, though, U.S. policy has buttressed the Iranian regime, which has justified its monopoly of power as a means of fending off external enemies and managing an economy under international duress.

More than sanctions or threats of military retribution, Iran's integration into the global economy would impose standards and discipline on the recalcitrant theocracy. International investors and institutions such as the World Trade Organization are far more subversive, as they would demand the prerequisites of a democratic society -transparency, the rule of law and decentralization- as a price for their commerce.

Paradoxically, to liberalize the theocratic state, the United States would do better to shelve its containment strategy and embark on a policy of unconditional dialogue and sanctions relief. A reduced American threat would deprive the hard-liners of the conflict they need to justify their concentration of power. In the meantime, as Iran became assimilated into the global economy, the regime's influence would inevitably yield to the private sector, with its demands for accountability and reform.

It is important to appreciate that Iran has a political system without precedent or parallel in modern history. The struggle there is not just between reactionaries and reformers, conservatives and. liberals, but fundamentally between the state and society. A subtle means of diminishing the state and empowering the society is, in the end, the best manner of promoting not only democracy but also nuclear disarmament.

Glossary


Argument:   It has to do with the author’s intention in a paragraph, it is his reason and it is beyond what is merely and explicitly said.

Elimination:   It is a technique to get a specific argument in a paragraph. By applying this technique, you can omit unnecessary and irrelevant information to get to the essence of a text.

Substitution:  It is a technique that allows you to paraphrase and reformulate a specific argument suggested in every paragraph. This technique as well as the elimination one is also used when getting the overall argument or central theme.

Key words:  It is a technique used to concentrate on the most important information in a text, given through the form of content words or linguistic words that convey meaning. By adopting this technique, you necessarily obtain the specific argument and it also contributes to get the central theme or argument of the whole text.

Central Theme:  Once specific arguments have been obtained, you elaborate on one single statement the overall argument shown in a recurrent way and that represents the whole core of the text. There are 3 simple strategies to get it: the communicative function of the text, the discourse organizer and that recurrent argument that encapsulates the whole problem or thesis in the text.

Communicative Function:  It has to do with the author’s explicit intention in conveying his meaning. An author may expose, argue, compare, contrast, point out causes and effects and so forth arguments or reasons in the kinds of text we are dealing with in this book.

Controlling idea:  It is a sentence or a group of sentences below the title that lead you to start searching for the main idea in this type of texts. This sentence (or these sentences) is (or are) out of the text. It may consist of one, two or three sentences joined by punctuation mark. It can also take the form of questions. It is also referred to as the title of the first level. It can give light about the main communicative function of the text.

Main Idea:  It is a single one sentence inside the text that contains the core being treated in the text. It is obtained by following certain strategies. 

Main Secondary Idea: It is a single sentence that generally follows the MI and its function is to complete, support, clarify, add, confirm and so on the previous MI.

Secondary Secondary Idea:  It is a sentence inside the text that, at a deeper level, shows the author’s presence, intention or reflection about the MI of the text. It can appear before the MI, after; in the middle of a text. Its function is a kind of ‘breaking the line of thought’ or argumentation regarding a specific problem. There are some sentences that appear below a picture, at the bottom of the article as if they were different (subtitles of second and/or third level).

Linguistic Deviations (or Semantic deviations):  These are the words present in the main idea inside the text that are different from the ones announced in the controlling idea or title. These words appear as deviations or distractors to confuse you in finding the MI. Actually, they do complete its meaning. When the MI inside the text is the same controlling idea below the title, i.e. every single word is the same as it were taken identically out of the text, then, we say there are no linguistic deviations.

Synonyms:  A strategy used to search for the MI in the text taking as a point of departure the CI. You look for the similar words that express the same meaning.

Antonyms:  A strategy used to search for the MI in the text taking as a point of departure the CI. You look for completely distinct and different words that express just the right opposite meaning.

Context: Here, it refers to both linguistic and the socio-cultural situation.